Objective Probability, and Conditional Reasoning Seminar: The Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, Jon Williamson, 18 Nov

Wednesday 12 November 2014

INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

18 November 2014, 17:15 - 19:00

Objective Probability, and Conditional Reasoning Seminar: Room 243, Senate House, WC1 
The Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference
Jon Williamson (Kent)

This paper argues that David Lewis’ Principal Principle implies a version of the Principle of Indifference. The same is true for similar principles that seek to use features of evidence to constrain rational degrees of belief. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. (Joint work with Jim Hawthorne, Juergen Landes and Christian Wallmann.)

Ends.